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THE PERONIST REVOLUTION AND ITS 
AMBIGUOUS LEGACY 
Tulio Halperin-Donghi 
More than four decades after Peronism's triumphant invasion of the Argentine 
political scene, the country is still ruled by the movement born on that occasion, 
which - notwithstanding several dramatic reversals of fortune - still retains a solid 
and apparently durable hold on the Argentine electorate. 
That revolution in itself offers part of the explanation for such durable success: 
as is the case with the reforms introduced in Uruguay earlier in the century under 
batllismo, the model of society it strove to build never lost its attraction for the 
Argentine masses. However, while the nostalgic memory of the Peronist golden age 
is as much alive in Argentina as that of the times when Uruguay was a model country 
on the opposite shore of the River Plate, that memory does not offer the inspiration 
for the present that the batllista activist state still provides in Uruguay. On the 
contrary, Peronism managed to retain the power it reconquered in 1989, six years 
after its first nationwide defeat at the hands of its main rival, the Union Civica 
Radical (UCR), by leading a ruthless final offensive against what was left of the 
social legacy of the Peronist revolution, already fatally weakened by the 
hyperinflation of 1989 that brought the Radical interregnum to its ignominious close. 
The Peronist movement subsequently consolidated its hold on power by being as 
much the liquidator as the heir of the Peronist revolution. This success owes 
something to President Menem's talents for obfuscation, which allows him to sit 
comfortably on both sides of many issues, but is only possible because that legacy 
itself is more ambiguous than memory suggests. 
Put in its simplest terms, the dominant image of the Peronist revolution has as its 
defining feature the invasion of the political stage by the popular classes, with 
organised labour at their core. While this image is far from inaccurate, it 
unavoidably offers an excessively simplified version of both that revolution and its 
legacy. 
Let us first take a more detailed look at the revolution itself. It not only opened 
up for organised labour - until then a barely tolerated presence on the margins of 
Argentine public life - a shortcut to its very centre. No less importantly, it offered 
the military elite, that had dominated national politics since 1930, the only 
alternative to a return to power of the political forces it had forcibly marginalised for 
one and a half decades. The advantages such an alliance offered to both sides were 
too important for them not to overcome a legacy of mutual distrust, but that legacy 
was never cancelled. One of the consequences was the consolidation of Peron's 
dominant position in the new regime: for the military his being 'one of them' offered 
the best guarantee that the social transformation he had unleashed would go no 
farther than they were ready to tolerate; as for organised labour, it was only too 
aware that it needed Peron's continuous support to retain a position in national life 
that its political partners in the armed forces had accepted only reluctantly. 
To these partners, the Peronist revolution offered a way of eclipsing their role as 
passive, yet decisive, supporters of the regime of fake democracy forged by General 
Agustin P. Justo with the support of the right and centre parties. The same regime 
had co-operated with the army in the ouster of President Hipolito Yrigoyen, the 
organiser and leader of the majority party, the Radical Civic Union, that in 1930 had 
closed 68 years of uninterrupted constitutional rule. This was not, however, the only 
memory that the army would have liked to erase. The leader of the 1930 coup, 
General Jose Felix Uriburu, had failed in a half-hearted attempt to establish an 
authoritarian regime and eliminate the universal franchise. In 1943, the obvious 
failure of the pseudo-democratic experiment launched by his rival Justo encouraged 
the army to experiment, more determinedly but not more successfully, with the 
authoritarian alternative preferred by Uriburu. In 1945, the crushing defeat of the 
fascist powers inspired a less tolerant reaction to that new failure, leaving the by then 
dominant authoritarian military current in a desperate enough position for it to enter 
an alliance with a partner it found distasteful, and entrust its future to a comrade 
whose loyalty it had learned from sad experience it could not take for granted. 
While it was the danger of being crushed under the ruins of two failed political 
experiments for which public opinion held them responsible that led the armed 
forces to lend their decisive support to the Peronist revolution, these experiments 
had left a more complex and ambiguous legacy than an indignant public was ready to 
recognise: the Peronist revolution did not result in a clean break with them, but was 
to a considerable extent built on that unacknowledged legacy. 
One obvious link with the past was the continuing role of the military as a 
necessary source of support for the new regime. Its political presence was now more 
conspicuous than in the pseudo-constitutional era inaugurated in 1932. While the 
parties and political fractions that had supported the government of General Justo 
had provided practically all the political personnel for the federal and provincial 
administrations, the more limited support the Peronist government found in the 
political class encouraged it to fill many governorships and quite a few legislative 
seats with retired officers who had been close to Peron while in active service. In the 
view of Peron's first war minister, General Humberto Sosa Molina, the increased 
presence of former army men in the first ranks of the new administration was not to 
be seen as a sign that the army as an institution had become an active partner in the 
Peronist regime. Notwithstanding Sosa Molina's roots in the authoritarian, 
antidemocratic current that venerated the memory of Uriburu, he took as his model 
the first minister of war under Justo, General Manuel Rodriguez, who had 
successfully restricted the role of the army to the one prescribed in the Constitution; 
in Sosa Molina's view, the loyalty the army owed to Per6n went to a legitimate 
president, and not to the leader of a revolutionary movement. Thus, a paradoxical 
feature of the era of fake electoral democracy was resurrected under Peron: the army 
was, once again, only a silent partner in a regime it had decisively contributed 
towards putting in place. 
The corollaries were, however, different from the Justo years, when, albeit with 
their legitimacy contaminated at the source by electoral fraud, the institutions of the 
republic had functioned with remarkable normalcy, and the basic political freedoms 
had suffered only limited encroachments. Now the situation was exactly the 
opposite: political freedoms were progressively restricted, and power concentrated 
as never before in the hands of a president who was also the leader of a revolution in 
progress. However, the army found a powerful alibi for its support of the unrelenting 
liquidation of the liberal republic in the increasing electoral success of the new 
regime. That support was thus conditional on the survival of multi-party elections in 
which votes were honestly counted. This might appear an insignificant restriction for 
a regime that since 1948 consistently retained the allegiance of at least 60 per cent of 
the voters. In fact, it had more serious consequences than might appear at first 
glance: in his policy decisions this quasi-dictator had to pay even more attention to 
their electoral impact than many leaders of fully democratic governments. 
While the legacy the army retained from its past included a commitment to the 
perpetuation of the universal franchise, it did also include a much more reticent 
attitude towards the ideological underpinnings of that system. It was not only that 
since 1930 the authoritarian currents that contemptuously rejected it had found an 
increasing audience in the army ranks. Even before then, the army had shared with 
the rest of the ruling elites the deeply ambiguous view of representative democracy 
best articulated by Sarmiento in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions. Convinced 
that these revolutions had opened the way for the final triumph of the principle of 
popular sovereignty, Sarmiento had concluded that the task was now 'to educate the 
sovereign'. After playing the role of regents and tutors of an infant monarch for the 
first half-century of the constitutional era, in 1912 the leaders of the oligarchic 
republic - hoping that the educational process had been successfully completed -
decided to emancipate their pupil. Disappointed by the consequences of that 
decision, from 1930 onwards the elites of the old republic (the military among them) 
oscillated between the notion that the principle of popular sovereignty was 
intrinsically wrong and the more modest conclusion that the sovereign still had much 
to learn (a point made frequently and at length in President Justo's public speeches). 
The armed forces appeared increasingly ready to conclude that, since the old 
political elite was no more fit to govern than the beneficiaries of the universal 
franchise, they were the only elite that could still play the necessary role of ruler and 
teacher of the Argentine masses. 
This conviction was frequently expressed in a language that echoed the anti-
democratic authoritarian ideologies in vogue in the 1930s. However, under these 
new influences, the practices matured in the previous history of the army (and the 
assumptions implicit in these practices) still weighed heavily on it. These 
assumptions, embedded in the political and ideological traditions developed in the 
first half century of the constitutional era, were shared by the army along with the 
rest of the techno-bureaucracy created under its wing, and having, since 1932, fully 
recovered the influence they had partially lost during the short democratic 
experiment initiated in 1912. 
Two of these assumptions were particularly relevant to the situation created by 
the military takeover of 1943. First, in the relations between the state and society the 
former was seen as the active element, whose task had been to give shape to the 
latter according to the blueprint drawn up by the founding fathers of modern 
Argentina. This view ran against the basic principles of a democratic political order, 
according to which, when the new democratic republic introduced reforms inspired 
by demands coming from society, such as the minimum wage or the eight-hour day, 
it engaged in a massive bribery of the electorate, which expanded and aggravated the 
practices of patronage that had been a blemish on the oligarchic order. 
It did not, however, follow that these reforms were rejected as intrinsically 
wrong. Neither the army officers nor the civilian techno-bureaucrats saw themselves 
as political and administrative agents of the business elites that opposed them for 
obvious reasons. Their opposition had a very different source: to them, the role of 
the state was that of a sovereign arbiter between all social interests, and they were 
ready to recognise that, in fulfilling that role, its first duty was to ensure the 
maximum possible welfare to as large a section of the population as was feasible. 
In their view, the state's role as arbiter was made easier by the abundance of 
material resources with which Argentina had been blessed, making it possible to 
satisfy the legitimate demands of capitalists as well as workers. While in the less 
fortunate countries of the Old World scarcity made the class conflict unavoidable, in 
Argentina avoiding it required only that the social actors maintain their greed within 
reasonable limits. This assumption was shared by a much larger consensus than 
might be expected; in unguarded moments, even socialist leaders could be heard 
proclaiming that in Argentina the class struggle could be easily avoided, if only 
business developed a more mature sense of its social responsibilities. 
The ideological construct that came closest to integrate these inchoate 
convictions and assumptions was the social doctrine promulgated by Pope Leo XIII 
in 1891, which in proclaiming both the arbitral role of the state as dispenser of 
commutative justice and the moral duty of the propertied classes towards the 
workers hoped to offer a better alternative to the socialist ideologies that were 
winning the allegiance of the working classes. 
However, while throughout the twentieth century, and more markedly during the 
interwar years, the Church achieved greater influence in Argentina than at any other 
time since independence, its success owed very little to the attraction of its social 
doctrines. The allegiance of the working classes continued to go to organisers of 
social democratic and anarchist - and later syndicaliste and communist - persuasion, 
and while the entrepreneurial classes increased the signs of their Catholic devotion, 
they were to remain remarkably deaf to the Church's occasional reminders that they 
had strict moral and religious duties towards their workers. 
The increasing influence of the Church owed more to the weakening of the 
militant secularism that had won the favour of vast sectors of the Argentine elites in 
the last decades of the previous century, and even more to the increasing alarm with 
which these elites reacted to the rise of notionally revolutionary working-class 
movements. In this new ideological and political climate, the Church was now 
recognised as a much-needed partner in any political project geared towards 
restoring social order and discipline. Its presence in the military regime installed in 
1943 was much more conspicuous than in that of 1930, and the regime's 
reintroduction of the teaching of the Catholic religion into the curriculum of primary 
schools was universally seen as the natural complement to the dissolution of all 
political parties and the imposition of severe restrictions on the press in what was no 
less universally recognised as the first stage in the introduction of an authoritarian 
right-wing regime. 
Organised labour, the other major partner in the Peronist revolution, also brought 
its own baggage of practices and implicit assumptions. While it had never explicitly 
abandoned the revolutionary ideologies that had accompanied its birth, from early on 
it had proved ready and eager to be accepted as an integral part of the existing social 
and political order. Thus syndicalisme, which had intended to restore the 
revolutionary vocation of Marxism by rejecting the party political struggle, offered 
Argentine labour organisers the justification for severing any organic link with the 
Socialist Party in order to enter into discreet alliances of mutual interest with the 
Radical government. After the ouster of the Radicals in 1930, the restored 
Conservative republic did not offer the opportunity for similar alliances, and the 
Socialist influence regained much of the ground it had lost in the previous decade. 
However, this was the case because by then the Socialist Party was a part of the 
political establishment, and as such could provide some legislative support and some 
protection to the unions close to it. 
The 1930s also witnessed a vigorous expansion of the Communist influence: a 
team of exceptionally able and devoted labour leaders successfully organised the 
building trades (coming from nowhere, in a couple of years the federation they 
created became second only to the giant of Argentine labour, the Union Ferroviaria), 
and the meat-packing plants. But by then the Communists, eager to adapt the 
worldwide Popular Front tactics to the needs of a party whose prior objective was 
now to be accepted as a legitimate actor in the political arena, without renouncing 
their commitment to a revolutionary future, placed much less emphasis on it than had 
been the case until 1935. 
These revolutionary ideologies were not by then an important source of 
inspiration for the working classes. Their influence, which had probably dissipated 
among Socialist organisers, was strong among their Communist counterparts, but it 
is doubtful that they had been as successful in converting their followers to their 
political faith as they had been in recruiting them for the new unions. 
It is more likely that these followers shared with the rest of the labour world a 
view that combined the recognition of the central role of the class struggle with that 
of the permanence of capitalism. In this view, the capitalist enterprise, by its very 
nature, worked on the assumption that labour was a commodity as any other, a 
notion rejected by most political and social currents and explicitly condemned by 
international treaties: only the perpetual vigilance of the working class could force it 
to function according to principles whose validity was by then universally 
recognised. 
Moreover, to the labour leaders (except again for the Communists) the expansion 
of the unions in the late 1930s suggested that they were entitled to a more central 
place in public life than the existing political forces (including the notionally 
working-class parties) were ready to open for them. The creation of a labour party 
became a subject of open discussion among the still large sections of organised 
labour that continued to pay lip service to the principles of syndicalisme, and was 
more discreetly pondered by the socialist organisers, many of whom resented their 
marginalisation by the party's middle-class founders, who still ruled it with an iron 
hand. 
While the partners in the Peronist revolution did not innovate in any important 
way on the previous ideological landscape, the revolution itself ran against many of 
the central assumptions of the authoritarian currents that had found a following 
among the military - assumptions more widely shared by the rest of the political and 
social elites than it might appear at first glance. 
The most important discrepancy came from the central role labour had played 
within that revolution: while in 1943 the army had intended to launch a revolution 
from above, one in which the state would once again reshape society according to its 
own blueprint, the failure of that project had forced it to acquiesce in a very different 
revolution, in which society itself became a decisive actor. This was not the 
revolution the army had planned in 1943, but neither was it the one Peron had in 
mind when he first turned towards labour for support: at the time he assigned the 
unions the more modest role of minor partners who would save him from depending 
exclusively on the support of one of the traditional parties, preferably the majority 
Radicals, with whom he hoped to establish an alliance of mutual interest. It was the 
failure of this original project that had forced him to assign labour a central place in 
his regime, as a privileged partner from whose suffocating embrace he was to try in 
vain to escape for the rest of his public career. 
The Peronist revolution innovated in yet another aspect on the assumptions of the 
political and social actors that joined in its support. Once the revolutionary hopes 
that marked the birth of the labour movement dissipated, the unions developed a 
sincere allegiance to the institutions of the liberal-democratic republic (an allegiance 
still shared without reservations by the labour leaders who played a central role in 
the triumph of Peronism in 1945-6) that recognised no legitimate place in it for a 
quasi-dictatorial plebiscitary leader; for their part, the right-wing authoritarian 
currents that converged into Peronism had always wished to vest political power in 
an elite rather than an individual. 
On this point Peron decisively parted ways with all the ideological legacies of the 
participants of the Peronist revolution. In his opinion, in any political movement the 
leader was practically everything; this view of the role of the leader obviously owed 
much to his experience in the only institution he knew at first hand: the army. His 
task as leader of the Peronist movement was to impose total subordination on his 
followers, and for that purpose persuasion was to be preferred to an outright display 
of authority. On this point he was ready to acknowledge his debt to Mussolini, whom 
he admired as a master builder of political consensus. However, Peron was to prove 
a very free disciple of all his political masters: in his later years, after he had 
replaced Mussolini with De Gaulle as his main source of inspiration, for the first 
time in his long career he presided over a bloody purge in the ranks of his movement 
that was even less in the style of his new mentor than in that of his earlier one. 
Indeed, with him the army remained a much more important source of inspiration 
than any model taken from the world of politics. The organisational blueprints he 
was fond of devising for state and party institutions reflect this influence: neat 
hierarchical structures serving as conveyor belts that brought the will of the leader to 
all subordinate levels. However, in his political practices Peron was to prove no 
more faithful to the hierarchical-authoritarian inspiration he owed to the army than to 
the example of his political models: he soon discovered that his position at the helm 
of the Peronist movement was safer if that movement was left simmering on the 
brink of chaos. The danger of a catastrophic breakdown was more effective than the 
workings of a well-oiled authoritarian organisation in persuading his followers to 
turn to him as to the only one who could impose a semblance of cohesiveness on 
their unruly ranks. 
Such were the main influences on the course of the Peronist revolution: its 
political objective was the concentration of power in the hands of the leader; its 
limits were dictated by the need to revalidate its legitimacy through periodical 
competitive elections that constituted an incongruous but inescapable feature in a 
regime that displayed an increasingly totalitarian style of governance; its social and 
economic dimension was shaped by the tense relationship between its leader and the 
most important source of support it had found in Argentine society. However, only 
the exceptional prosperity of the early post-war years made it possible for that 
revolution to fulfil the exalted expectations of its popular clientele while introducing 
a nationalistic turn in the country's trade and financial policies. 
The Peronist revolution owed less to the action of the state than to its own 
agency: between 1945 and 1947 the number of unionised workers, in a country of 
fifteen million, tripled from half a million to a million and a half. Even if the workers 
were aware that the drastic change for the better in the state's attitude towards the 
unions had been a necessary precondition for such an impressive growth, they were 
also aware that their own initiative had played an even more decisive role in the 
dramatic rise in the share of labour in the GNP that was its result. 
This rise was facilitated, at least in the short run, by the previously mentioned 
turn the regime gave to its economic policies. In part it followed the trend of post-
war Europe; the nationalisation of the Central Bank came a few months after that of 
the Bank of England, and in nationalising the deposits in private banks, which in 
practice meant that in their lending policies these banks were to follow the directives 
emanating from the Central Bank, the Argentine reformers proved more timid than 
their French counterparts, who nationalised the four largest private banks. The same 
lack of originality could be detected in the nationalisation of foreign-owned railways 
and public utilities (an action imposed in part by the need to dispose of the exchange 
surpluses accumulated during the war and threatened by the post-war price rises in 
Britain and the United States). 
However, in other respects the Argentines proved ready to go even beyond the 
trade controls introduced by the warring powers, many of which were to linger in the 
early post-war years. The boards created during the depression to regulate the 
production and trade of the main export staples were incorporated into a new state 
branch that took total control of imports as well as exports, and became the most 
important instrument for the Peronist management of the economy. 
In selecting these economic policies, the regime worked on assumptions that 
were widely shared in Argentina and abroad. The second post-war period was 
expected to run a course similar to the first: economic reconstruction would be slow 
and uneven, and once completed, the economy would fall into a new period of 
stagnation. This being the case, the most sensible course of action appeared to be to 
take advantage of the trade surpluses accumulated during the war and of the 
expected post-war boom in agro-pastoral exports in order to consolidate an economy 
as sheltered as possible from an external sector whose long-term prospects appeared 
more alarming than reassuring. 
While this forecast was to be proven totally wrong, by 1945 it was unarguably 
part of the conventional wisdom. However, the Peronist regime was not to become a 
totally innocent victim of the faith it lent to it: the economic policies it introduced 
could only succeed if all the previsions included in it were fulfilled to excess; 
perhaps the reason why it accepted so easily such over-optimistic assumptions was 
that they offered justification for economic policies that promised to consolidate and 
expand the support Peronism had already won in the ranks of Argentine society. 
When viewed from this angle, these policies made admirable sense. By keeping a 
high exchange rate for the peso, it maintained low prices for the main export staples 
- that were at the same time the most important wage goods - as well as for imports, 
while the tight control of the latter restricted them to fuel and industrial inputs. The 
advantage thus won by the industrial and popular classes, in the cities of a country 
that was already predominantly urban, was admittedly achieved at the expense of the 
agricultural-pastoral interest, and the grain belts of the riverside provinces still held 
an important concentration of voters. Here, however, the discontent was attenuated 
by a freeze in rents that benefited the numerically predominant tenant farmers. In the 
short run, and combined with the continued electoral progress of Peronism in the 
towns of the grain belt, this proved sufficient to protect the movement's majorities in 
these areas. 
The Peronist revolution did not display much creativity or imagination in 
reaching the social sectors it intended to favour. Its main instrument was abundant 
low-interest credit channelled thorough the veteran National Mortgage Bank for 
urban housing and the more recent Industrial Bank. In consequence, Argentina knew 
only a mild version of the redevelopment policies that in Europe, both Eastern and 
Western, promoted desolate rings of high-rise buildings around its largest cities; 
instead, brick and mortar replaced wood and corrugated metal in the existing lower-
class neighbourhoods. The impact of state credit on industry was reflected in 
expansion without entrepreneurial concentration; between 1935 and 1955 the 
number of industrial enterprises rose more quickly than that of industrial workers. 
For its beneficiaries, the Peronist revolution introduced changes that fully justify 
the nostalgia with which it is remembered: while dramatically improving the living 
standards of the wage-earners, it opened up new opportunities to the initiative of 
ambitious members of the lower middle class and the more prosperous sections of 
the popular classes. Under the shelter of the Peronist state, the day-to-day experience 
of the urban majorities was of an unregimented existence and an optimistic mood 
fuelled by the vigorous upward movement that had already changed so much in their 
living conditions. 
The contrast between an increasingly authoritarian political context and a much 
more free and unregimented social experience was reflected in the one between a 
state, with which the new regime had tinkered only to a very limited extent and the 
organisation of the Peronist movement, with a command structure borrowed from the 
army: its commander-in-chief appointed and removed all its officers, who served at 
his pleasure. However, even within the movement this authoritarian ideal had not 
been completely implemented; the men's and women's organisations in its ranks had 
been joined by the Confederation General del Trabajo (CGT) - that pre-existed the 
Peronist revolution - in which the leadership was still formally elected by the 
member unions, rather than appointed from above. While after 1947 the authorities 
of the third branch were in fact equally imposed by Peron, this formal asymmetry in 
the structure of the Peronist movement was a reminder of the central role labour had 
played in its rise; to Peron it was a no less urgent reminder of the need to weaken 
that original link, and to limit the influence the unions still retained within the 
movement. 
Once that movement had brought Peron to power in the general elections of 
February 1946, for him the first order of business was not only to implement a firm 
control of the social and political forces that supported it, but to enlarge that support, 
which had granted him an uncomfortably narrow victory. In achieving both 
objectives he counted on the decisive co-operation of his new wife, the former Eva 
Duarte, who not only took over the day-to-day supervision of the union leadership, 
but led in the effort to expand the Peronist base through the creation of the women's 
branch, making easy strides in the virgin electoral territory annexed by the law that 
granted the vote to women in 1947 and finding a new recruiting ground for the 
Peronist movement among the vast popular sectors that escaped the action of the 
labour organisers: the lower-lower class in the modernised regions of Argentina and 
the popular majorities in the peripheral areas, which became the main beneficiaries 
of the efforts of the Foundation that bore her name. 
In later years, after it dawned on Peron that he faced the danger of entering 
history as the husband of Eva Peron, his unenthusiastic tributes to her contribution to 
the Peronist movement continued to recognise her readiness to devote an immense 
effort to these vast objectives. He was now less ready to recognise her role in 
shaping the Peronist vision. Her contribution to it went far beyond providing it with 
its central icon, a position she had conquered in life and was to retain with a 
vengeance after her death in 1952. As the self-appointed high priestess in the cult of 
her husband's personality, she established standards of fanatic and self-effacing 
devotion to which all leaders were bound to offer at least lip-service, that made a 
disagreement with the supreme leader literally unthinkable. Equally important, in 
tracing the profile of the quintessential Peronist, she offered an alternative to the 
descamisado (literally the shirtless one, but in fact an awkward translation of the 
French sans-culotte that Peronism had inherited from the anarchist currents within 
the labour movement) in los humildes (the humble). In her vocabulary, the 
expression was as alien to any notion of Christian meekness as in that of Castro's 
Cuba, where this non-Marxist term is also vastly popular: it referred to all those who 
had suffered humiliation under the reign of the oligarchy, whose avenger she 
promised to become. While within the movement's leadership Eva Peron continued 
to be the chief ally and protector of the union elites on whom she had imposed total 
docility, the two titles bestowed on her by the controlled media ('Lady of Hope' and 
'Standard-bearer for the Humble') were justified in claiming for her a base in 
Argentine society that went much beyond the world of labour. 
Peronism was so successful in expanding its influence beyond that world that by 
the early 1950s the nationwide Peronist vote held a negative correlation with the 
share of the workers within the electorate, not because the workers' loyalty to the 
movement had weakened, but because their share in the electorate of the modern 
core of Argentina was lower than that of the less differentiated popular voters in the 
more archaic peripheral areas, where the movement now achieved its most 
overwhelming victories. 
In these areas Peronism, in recruiting and organising its electoral clienteles, did 
not go much beyond building with much larger state resources patronage networks 
larger in size but no different in kind from those created in the past by Conservatives 
and Radicals. This required the services of a vast political personnel, traditionally 
more interested in the rivalries within its ranks that in the political cause it notionally 
served. The danger of internal division, which had frequently proven fatal to the 
traditional parties, was avoided in part by the hierarchical and centralised nature of 
the Peronist movement, in which success went to those who could offer the most 
convincing proof of loyalty to the supreme command. 
By 1949 the constitutional reform that eliminated the prohibition of immediate 
re-election for the president began the transformation of the Peronist government 
into a regime. The new constitutional text kept much of the old one, to which it 
added an article borrowed from the 1917 Mexican Constitution that imposed a 
nationalist mining policy, and a few others that echoed the social principles 
enshrined in most 20th century constitutions. The limitations it introduced on civil 
and political freedoms, while certainly less drastic, were as artfully hidden as in the 
Stalinist Soviet constitution of 1936. Beyond this, Peronism left its seal on the new 
text through the inclusion of the 'three banners' of the movement (political 
sovereignty, social justice and economic freedom) in the preamble, and the addition 
of a decalogue of workers' rights penned by General Peron (which suggestively did 
not include the right to strike) and another on those of old age due to the First Lady. 
The proclamation of justicialismo as a national doctrine soon followed, with which 
Peronism appropriated a basic feature of most totalitarian regimes. 
While the Peronist experience progressed with deliberate speed towards the 
authoritarian goals Peron had made his from the start, its economic foundations gave 
signs of increasing weakness. The post-war export bonanza proved weaker and 
shorter than expected. After 1918, a generous donation of grain to Austria had 
responded to the need for disgorging part of the Argentine wheat that Central Europe 
badly needed but could not afford, and in 1947 the no less generous long-term loans 
that saved Franco's Spain from certain famine had, in part, a similar rationale. Soon 
after that, the return to an inconvertible pound, added to the exclusion of Argentina 
from the list of countries whose exports could be acquired with funds from the 
Marshall Plan, brought about conditions reminiscent of those the export sector had 
faced during the 1930s. 
By 1949 price increases had accelerated and inflation became a pressing threat. 
Peron transferred the management of the economy from the 'shock team' (equipo de 
asalto) appointed in 1946 to a group of professionals headed by Dr Alfredo Gomez 
Morales, a veteran of Prebisch's Central Bank, who introduced a more cautious 
approach geared towards saving as much as possible of the advances made by the 
popular classes while gradually adapting the Argentine economy to the unfavourable 
new conditions. The main instrument used could not have been a more classical one 
(devaluation), but the new team chose to make sparing use of it and was careful to 
alleviate its effects with strong counter-inflationary policies that combined a totally 
orthodox reduction in public spending with a less orthodox, but temporarily 
successful, control on the prices of most consumption goods. Skilful use was also 
made of the few financial assets that could diminish the need to turn to inflationary 
financing (first among them being the vast surpluses of the social security system, 
much expanded by the regime, and invested in low-interest government bonds 
shunned by a public that was learning its first lessons in the consequences of 
inflation). By 1954 the annual inflation rate, which had earlier risen above 30 per 
cent, was under four per cent, and - as Dr Antonio Cafiero, a member of Gomez 
Morales's team, was to boast after the fall of the regime - this was to remain the only 
stabilisation plan in Argentine experience in which the share of labour in GNP 
actually increased: the new team had indeed remained as committed to the social 
objectives of the Peronist revolution as circumstances allowed. 
Dr Cafiero neglected to mention that the rise in labour's share of GNP did not 
reflect any rise in real wages, but a fall less steep than that of the profits for business. 
By 1955, it was clear that stabilisation had done nothing to alleviate the structural 
weaknesses in the national economy that had brought about the crisis of 1950-52. 
From early on, Peron had been aware that a more drastic change in economic 
policies was necessary; by then he was convinced that it could not be postponed any 
longer if his movement and regime were to be saved. He had good reason to feel 
reasonably confident of success: many among his political enemies would have 
agreed that his regime had already won new strength through the potentially more 
dangerous political crisis brought about by the end of the post-war prosperity. 
The surge of grass-roots energies which had tripled the number of unionised 
workers during the prosperity years, with the blessing of the Peronist administration, 
did not cease with the change in economic conditions From 1948 onwards, a new 
wave of strikes without any official blessing gathered intensity, reaching its climax in 
a 1951 railway strike that was denounced as a direct threat to the national economy. 
The honeymoon between the Peronist administration and the working class was at an 
end, and friends and foes alike wondered if the regime would be able to survive a 
more tense relationship with its more solid base of support (which perhaps explains 
the extreme harshness of the response to labour's unexpected challenge). 
The regime survived with less damage than everybody had expected: the 
honeymoon was over, but it had opened the way for a more humdrum and - as would 
be abundantly proven in the next decades - unshakeably solid marriage. This 
modification in the regime's relationship with the working classes demanded a more 
general redefinition of its place in Argentine society. In the view of Federico Pinedo, 
the former socialist who had played a central role in the economic reforms of the 
Justo administration, it created the opportunity for a gradual return to the traditional 
style of Argentine politics, which had always secured a place for oppositional forces, 
albeit one much more restricted than in authentic multi-party democracies. To 
Pinedo, with the rectification of economic policies already underway, the opposition 
had already won the day on the most important issue that divided it from the regime. 
It was time for them to recognise, without reservation, the legitimacy of a 
government repeatedly voted to power by solid majorities; he hoped that the 
transformation of the rabidly hostile non-Peronist political forces into a loyal 
opposition would persuade Peron to adjust his political style to the norms of 
Argentina's admittedly rudimentary republican tradition. 
While Pinedo was too tactful to mention it, the death of Eva Peron also favoured 
the kind of normalisation he had in mind; not only would her incendiary oratory 
cease to exasperate the marginalised opposition, but with her disappeared the most 
important ally of the union elites in the inner circle of the regime. 
Peron chose to advance in the opposite direction. He saw the loosening of his 
privileged link to the world of labour as a unique opportunity to restructure 
Argentina as an 'organised community', in which all social sectors would be 
represented by corporate organisations that would follow the inspiration of the state 
and the regime. In the future, the Peronist movement would not accept any social 
forces as its allies, but merely as its instruments; this shift in attitude was in due 
course to place it on a collision course with the Church and immediately introduced 
new tensions in Peron's relations with the army. Sosa Molina was transferred to a 
decorative position as Minister of National Defence, and General Franklin Lucero, 
as secretary of the army, took charge of its 'Peronisation'; soon most officers were to 
resent being forced to increase the expressions of deep devotion to the regime and its 
leader. 
By 1951 a badly organised coup led by General Menendez - prematurely 
launched in order to pre-empt a better prepared one - was a total failure, but 
revealed that for Peronism the army was now contested territory; in 1952 a 
temporary scarcity of beef created enough unrest for some opposition elements to try 
to ride the wave of discontent with a terrorist attack that caused several casualties 
among the public attending a rally in which Peron promised his followers to take 
personal charge of uprooting corruption in high places. The indiscriminate - and 
remarkably successful - repression that ensued persuaded the opposition and the 
social forces that the regime's hold on power was firmer than ever. For the first time, 
a pro-Peronist business organisation managed to establish roots in trade and 
industry, and the rural associations - from the Rural Society of the large landowners 
to the Agrarian Federation of the small cereal farmers - finally offered their explicit 
obeisance to the regime. And in the 1954 general elections the Peronist vote, once 
again, was double that of the Radical opposition, whose parliamentary representation 
had been reduced to a minimum by two successive reforms of the electoral laws. 
By then Peron felt strong enough to launch the final metamorphosis of his 
regime, designed to place it above the classes as a universally accepted (and feared) 
arbiter among them. In addition, he hoped to consolidate its economic base by giving 
foreign capital access to an economy that, still sheltered by very high protective 
barriers, promised attractively high profits. He inaugurated these new policies with a 
contract with a branch of Standard Oil for the exploitation of the oil fields. Thus, he 
set out along a road leading towards a totalitarian regime, more dependent on 
vigilance and repression than on the militant support of any social faction, while -
renouncing earlier ambitions to an independent role in the world scene - instead he 
accepted a necessarily subordinate place in a western world dominated by the United 
States in the political as well as the economic sphere. 
There was little reason to doubt that, once that metamorphosis was complete, the 
Peronist regime would become as permanent as those of Franco and Salazar. 
However, the regime still retained some features that suggested that this final 
transformation was not progressing as smoothly as might appear at first glance. The 
new political model assumed that the supreme leader would devote all his time and 
effort to the day-to-day control of the organisations that were to impose the regime's 
will on all sections of society. Eva Peron had been endowed with the obsessive drive 
needed for such a task; her husband, a master of improvisation, was perhaps too 
lazy, perhaps not obsessed enough to replace her in that necessary role, and was not 
ready to transfer it to a political agent whose loyalty he could not take for granted. 
The consequences were clear in the performance of the Partido Peronista Femenino, 
the leadership of which he took over from his dead wife. In fact, the branch was now 
leaderless; the damage was not too serious in that its second-rank leaders, former 
head nurses and principals of elementary schools, felt empowered enough as 
managers of a much larger organisation than the ones they had left behind, and 
continued in tolerable harmony to follow the routines established by the founder of 
their branch. 
The unions posed a more serious problem, and Peron tried to solve it by 
downplaying the role of labour's umbrella organisation, the CGT. The unwanted, but 
unavoidable, consequence was that the larger unions regained part of the autonomy 
they had enjoyed in the pre-Peronist past. The shift posed particularly serious 
dangers because the working classes, while always immune to the attractions of 
political dissidence, refused to acknowledge that their place in Peronist Argentina 
had now changed. 
Thus, as late as 1954, in a month-long strike the metalworkers successfully 
resisted Peron's effort to limit their pay rises to the level authorised by his anti-
inflationary policies; admittedly by finally yielding to the workers' demands in this 
matter he was able to engineer the ouster of the leaders who had reluctantly called 
the strike in response to overwhelming grass-roots pressure. However, this reminder 
of the penalties incurred by those leaders who did not display the blind loyalty 
expected from them on all occasions was not totally convincing: the new union 
leadership was recruited among the militant shop stewards who had led the agitation 
forcing their predecessors to call the strike. Moreover, even if it had been more 
convincing, Peron's victory over these reluctant rebels could not hide the fact that -
with the metamorphosis of what had been born as a chaotic grass-roots mobilisation 
into a totalitarian political force - in the matters that really counted, his relationship 
with the old working-class core of his following appeared strangely unaffected by 
this radical transformation in the nature of the Peronist movement. 
Thus Peron was on shakier ground than he believed when he launched a savage 
attack against an ally who he knew he could never reduce to total obedience, and the 
final offensive against clerical influence defiantly launched in November 1954 was 
to end ten months later with his fall from power. While slow to mobilise, the reaction 
of political Catholicism gained in intensity as month followed month, and the same 
was true for that of the political forces that had been in opposition to the regime 
since its inception, and faced total marginalisation, or worse, if Peron succeeded in 
his final gamble. By mid-1955 the enlarged opposition was able to gather force: a 
failed coup in June was followed in September by a limited insurrection that won the 
day thanks to the passivity of the bulk of the army and the decisive support of the 
navy. The reaction of the three branches of the Peronist movement proved equally 
flaccid, and the Peronist masses, discouraged from any form of mobilisation by their 
leaders - who remained true to Peron's mot d'ordre for militants in troubled times 
('from home to the workplace and back') - were only to engage in heroic but futile 
acts of resistance after the fall of their leader. Peron himself displayed a similar 
passivity: when his shrewd message to Lucero, instructing him to open negotiations 
with the rebels and vaguely alluding to his own readiness for eventual sacrifices, was 
read by his nominally loyal generals as a letter of resignation, he took refuge in the 
Paraguayan embassy. Thus started an exile that was to last for eighteen years. 
* * * 
Even if Peron's departure had been the end of the Peronist revolution, it would have 
left as its legacy the tension it had never been able to solve between the expectations 
of durable prosperity it had inspired among the popular classes and the temporary 
nature of the economic conditions that had allowed it to fulfil these expectations 
during the short post-war bonanza. 
At first glance, the new rulers' readiness to accept that they were now called to 
solve the dilemma that had undermined the Peronist regime was somewhat 
surprising. However, on taking power the victors of September 1955 were convinced 
that - if only the corruption and incompetence of the fallen regime was eliminated -
it would prove easy to retain what, borrowing from the vocabulary of that regime, 
they unselfconsciously continued to call its social achievements (conquistas 
sociales), while shifting towards the primary export sector the massive resources and 
credit it needed if it was to recover its old vigour. This illusion was soon dissipated, 
but the awareness remained that in post-Peronist Argentina the managers of the 
state's economic policies could not afford to ignore their impact on the welfare of 
the urban working and popular classes. This was so because not only the military 
rulers' sincere convictions, but also their shaky control of the purged armed forces 
committed them to a comparatively quick return to elected governments. And while 
they were increasingly determined not to allow the Peronist movement to survive as 
a legitimate actor in the electoral and political arena, they were convinced that in 
order to destroy its roots in Argentine society, its former supporters had to be 
granted social and economic conditions that they would find at least tolerable. 
By 1957 it became painfully clear to the military rulers that they had not 
achieved even this more modest goal. Notwithstanding a massive recourse to 
electoral manipulation on the part of the those behind the congress called to 
reorganise the CGT, the hoped-for anti-Peronist majority did not ensue. It was clear 
that in the former third branch of the Peronist movement, resuscitated on the 
initiative of the military government, a total victory of the Peronist labour currents 
was only a matter of time. Soon after that, the results of the general elections for a 
Constituent Assembly revealed that Peron's mot d'ordre favouring a blank vote had 
been followed by a quarter of the electorate: Peronism was still very much alive, not 
only as a social movement but also as a political force. 
This reborn Peronism was a different movement in a different country. It owed 
its survival to the initiatives of second-rank union leaders who, after years of 
quiescence and notwithstanding the military government's harsh but haphazard 
repression, recreated a climate of permanent mobilisation in the workplace, and -
ignoring Peron's explicit instructions - participated in the elections called by the 
military government to normalise the unions. Their success persuaded Peron to 
forgive their indiscipline, and proclaim that once again, as in 1945, organised labour 
had proven the backbone of the Peronist movement. For the moment it was almost 
the whole movement, but already the imminent return to an elected government was 
slowly bringing back onto the scene the leadership of the political branches that, 
with few individual exceptions, had hastened to desert it at the fall of the regime. 
Peron had reluctantly accepted as a painful fact of life the rise of an union 
movement that had won a place of its own in post-Peronist Argentina by its own 
effort, and enjoyed a degree of autonomy within the Peronist movement it had never 
known in the past, but was determined not to allow the political branches to create an 
independent political base for themselves. This was probably an important reason for 
the support he lent during the general elections of February 1958 not only to the 
presidential candidacy of Arturo Frondizi, but to the entire list of candidates 
representing Frondizi's fraction of the divided Radical Party: by doing so, he 
deprived the political branches of his movement of the opportunity to win an 
important share in the representative bodies and the provincial administrations of 
post-Peronist Argentina. 
A new Peronist movement was thus being born in a silent tug of war between the 
exiled leader and the bosses of the political and the union branches (those of the 
former women's branch appeared as satisfied as in the past with their subordinate 
position within the movement, and the branch itself was not resurrected as a separate 
organisation). The future course of that unacknowledged conflict was to be 
influenced by the changing social and political landscape of post-Peronist Argentina. 
On reaching the Presidency, Frondizi's policies were reminiscent of those that 
Peron himself had tried to introduce on the eve of his fall. An influx of foreign 
investment was expected to expand oil production and create a new industrial sector 
in durable consumer goods that would supply the starved internal market with the 
cars and lorries it had not been able to import for more than a decade, creating 
numerous new jobs for qualified workers. The new policies could, however, do very 
little to alleviate the negative impact of the shift in the balance between agriculture 
and industry first introduced by Peron in the early fifties, and intensified first by the 
military, then by Frondizi in the hope of restoring the vitality of the export economy. 
Due mostly to adverse external conditions, these policies were only to bear fruit after 
1963; in the meantime they had a strong negative effect on the living standards of the 
urban popular classes. Taking advantage of their discontent, in 1959 the resurgent 
labour movement - motivated in part by Frondizi's refusal to grant it and the rest of 
the Peronist movement a place among the legitimate political forces - launched a 
full-scale offensive against the ungrateful president, who reacted with a repression 
far more intense and systematic than the one recently led by the military, and 
inflicted a clear defeat. 
As Daniel James has convincingly shown,1 that defeat marked a turning point in 
the history of Argentine labour; grass-roots mobilisations gave way to the dominance 
of the bureaucratised leadership of the largest unions, which negotiated the 
conditions under which they would guarantee social peace with business and the 
government. In fulfilling this task, they were careful to consolidate its institutional 
and financial base. To the hospital systems they had begun to build in the Peronist 
years and dramatically expanded in the aftermath, they now added flourishing 
tourism empires (before 1955 turismo social had been an almost complete monopoly 
of the Fundacion Eva Peron); in the 1960s Mar del Plata, the former playground of 
the oligarchy shared since the twenties by the middle classes, was flooded by 
hundreds of thousands of vacationing workers lodged in the hotels acquired by the 
unions. 
Thus, a notionally semi-illegal organisation (the institutional rebirth of the CGT 
came much later than expected, and its formal existence was to be interrupted time 
and again by dissolution decrees) became the most affluent player in the political 
arena: the unions were now not only the backbone, but also the paymasters of the 
Peronist movement. This new role held dangers for the future, in that it offered a 
political justification for financial manipulations that created opportunities for 
corruption, and indeed the lifestyle of some union bosses (who became collectors of 
modern art or owned racehorses) suggested that they were already taking advantage 
of these opportunities. However, much to the disappointment of their critics from the 
left, the rank-and-file did not appear to begrudge them the right to such indulgences. 
1 See James, D., Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class, 
1946-76 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
This was because unionised workers were convinced that the union leadership 
quite effectively fulfilled its traditional role of protecting their living standards. True, 
in the two decades of undramatic and intermittent, but not insignificant, economic 
growth that followed the fall of the Peronist regime in 1955, real wages had 
remained stagnant: in fact, between 1950 and 1970 the ratio of labour to capital in 
GNP fell from 110 per cent to 75 per cent. These figures did not, however, reflect a 
steady process, but the cumulative result of a succession of growth spurts ended by 
crises in the balance of payments, devaluations accompanied by stringent financial 
policies and a fall in real wages. To the workers, the movement of their real wages 
was the composite result of the impersonal impact of the bursts of inflation followed 
by recession that marked the downward turns of the economy and the wage rises 
negotiated by the unions once the economic trend changed for the better. Aware that 
under inflationary conditions they had to run hard to stay in place, and without 
harbouring too many illusions about the depth of their leaders' commitment to the 
cause of labour, or even about their personal honesty, the workers were not wrong in 
concluding that the unions had an irreplaceable role in leading the running. 
Moreover, the union leadership not only ensured that in the long run real wages 
would not fall, it also influenced the distribution of the increases in nominal wages 
among workers in different branches. Industrial expansion was concentrated in 
capital-intensive branches (durable consumer goods, led by automobiles, and later 
steel, aluminium and petrochemicals) dominated by large enterprises, most of them 
multinationals, that required a limited number of mostly skilled workers. A more 
archaic industrial sector, marked by technological backwardness and comparatively 
low productivity, survived alongside them. The potential was there for an increasing 
wage differential between old and new industry, but the union leadership saw to it 
that the potential was not realised. Of course, for real wages in the old industry not to 
lag too much behind those of the new and more dynamic ones, that industry itself 
needed to be protected against outside competition. The defence of wages for the 
large majority of industrial workers employed in the older industries had as its 
necessary complement the defence of those industries themselves. In fact, the 
union's wage policy had as its implicit precondition the defence of full employment, 
and soon the increasing loss of competitivity of the old industry brought the 
objective of full employment onto the political aganda. 
Of course, labour coincided in the defence of full employment with other sectoral 
interests that chose to join the battle for reasons of their own. This was merely an 
example of the impact the inflationary cycle achieved in encouraging the diverse 
social and economic sectors to establish alliances. Thus, when inflation threatened to 
run out of control, industrialists were inclined to join the primary-export interests in 
supporting a programme of devaluation combined with deflation. However, the 
ensuing recession did not need to last too long for them to join the unions in asking 
for an easing of credit that would reactivate demand - temporarily forgetting that 
past experience had shown that such easing marked the first stage in the return of 
inflation. And at times, when governments attempted to contain inflation by 
combining a highly valued national currency with a tight fiscal and credit policy that 
perpetuated the recession, the unions were desperate enough to support the primary-
export sector's demands for a devaluation, from which they knew they could not 
expect any immediate advantage, but which, by breaking the impasse, would restart 
an inflationary cycle in the course of which they could expect to enjoy admittedly 
brief periods of favourable economic conditions. 
Under the circumstances of inflation, labour militancy did not necessarily place it 
on a collision course with all other social sectors, and thanks to their astute sense of 
timing and tactical agility, for the first time in Argentine experience the unions were 
close to being accepted as legitimate institutional and social actors in public life. In 
fact, by early 1960, when many believed that Argentina would only regain stable 
institutions if these agreed to serve as agents for what were called factores de poder, 
the corporations and social interests that wielded real power in the country, there was 
general agreement that these factores were four and only four: namely the armed 
forces, the Church, business and organised labour. 
In the past the main obstacle to labour's recognition as a legitimate social and 
political actor had been the notion that placed it in permanent and irreconcilable 
conflict with the existing social order. Recent experience had done much to dissipate 
that concern, but now organised labour found a different obstacle on its way towards 
full respectability. As the main branch of a political movement whose exiled leader -
to whom it proclaimed undying devotion - had been reduced, by the decision of the 
armed forces, to the condition of a perpetual political pariah, it could not hope to win 
the full acquiescence of the most powerful of the factores de poder for its integration 
into the Argentine power elite. 
The temptation was great to break the link established in the journee of 17 
October 1945, between the two partners that on that date created the Peronist 
movement. The return to a semi-constitutional regime in 1958 had allowed the 
resurgent Peronist movement to expand once again beyond its original working-class 
core. More than one peripheral province now had a neo-Peronist administration, but 
this development did not significantly weaken the overwhelmingly dominant 
influence labour had won over the movement since its rebirth. 
This was so in part because the objectives of the neo-Peronist administrations 
were close to those of the unions. Without the guidance and control of the over-
centralised party structure prior to 1955, the provincial Peronist movements had 
strong local roots and once in power built fiercely independent and effective 
organisations under strongly personalistic leaders, who made lavish use of 
patronage. Under the Peronist banner, a number of provinces in the interior, the 
upper littoral and Patagonia experienced a return to the gobiernos de familia of the 
oligarchic era. 
These administrations did not need to reassure the propertied classes about the 
sincerity of their commitment to the existing social order. Instead, while maintaining 
the appearance of political opposition, they needed to avoid placing any real 
obstacles in the path of the federal government. This was so because, by then, the 
administrations of marginal provinces could not survive without massive injections 
of funds from the federal budget; understandably the new provincial bosses were no 
more inclined that those of the unions to antagonise both their paymasters and the 
military by emphasising their allegiance to the exiled leader. 
By 1964 Augusto Vandor, the boss of the metalworkers' union, recognised by 
then as primus inter pares in the union leadership and close to taking control of the 
reconstituted Peronist party organisation, finally felt ready to dispute the leadership 
of the movement with its founder. Peron was forced to gamble his whole future when 
he submitted the dispute to the verdict of the voters. In several peripheral provinces 
his candidates were defeated by those of the new local organisations, but neither he 
nor Vandor considered these results a sufficient indication of the inclinations of the 
Peronist masses in the country at large. The decisive test came in Mendoza, a 
province with a long and strong labour tradition and a robust Peronist political 
organisation; and there Peron was the winner. The outcome persuaded the union 
movement to offer open support for a military takeover. More than ten years after 
the ouster of Peron, the formally constitutional regime restored in 1958 had proven 
unable either to integrate the Peronist forces into a new legality that stubbornly 
excluded their founder or surmount the challenge their hold on an increasing fraction 
of the electorate posed to the stability of the regime. The Peronist vote, first 
channelled towards local neo-Peronist lists and then gathered in nationwide electoral 
organisations authorised by the exiled leader, accounted for 36 per cent of the 
electorate in the congressional elections of 1965: Peronism, while not the majority 
party it had been in power, as the largest electoral force was in a position to make 
the existing political institutions unworkable if it chose to do so. 
Moreover, the armed forces resented the elected government's reluctance to 
support the fiercely anti-Cuba and pro-USA line they themselves favoured, and were 
increasingly ready to conclude from it not only that the allegiance of the political 
class to the existing social order was at best dubious, but that - even if this was not 
the case - its anachronistic devotion to what survived of the constitutional freedoms 
posed a serious obstacle to the defence of internal order, threatened by the wave of 
political radicalism unleashed by the Cuban revolution. 
The Argentine revolution of 1966 had been openly discussed for a whole year in 
the political weeklies and in the daily press, and had been touted as an institutional 
initiative of the armed forces led by its commanders, which would take charge of 
administering the state on behalf of the factores de poder. It was to follow a very 
different course: the armed forces retained a monopoly on power; the Church and 
business had a limited influence on their decisions; the unions had almost none. 
From 1967 to mid-1969 the totally unrepresentative new regime carried out a 
remarkably successful restructuring of the economy. Thanks to the new vigour of the 
agricultural-export sector, a devaluation and stabilisation plan could be introduced 
that did not bring about the drastic fall in real wages of most previous ones, and 
channelled to the government the windfall from devaluation to finance an ambitious 
plan of public works, while the rise in foreign investment caused by the success of 
stabilisation brought about a promising new wave of industrial expansion. These 
successes were viewed with alarm by the political and social organisations that the 
regime intended to replace with new ones that would count on its blessing. The 
cordobazo of May 1969, an urban riot of unprecedented dimensions in Argentine 
experience, suddenly revealed the consequences of the military regime's defiant 
isolation from society. Unleashed in the aftermath of an orderly protest by a 
moderate labour union that was violently repressed, it gathered the support of the 
suppressed university students' organisations and of the more militant unions. When 
the sympathisers of Peronism and of the Radical Party (that enjoyed vast support in 
Cordoba) joined the fray, the rioters won control of the city, until the belated arrival 
of army reinforcements brought the episode to an end. 
A new political landscape emerged from the cordobazo. By suppressing all 
political parties, the Argentine revolution had forced a reconciliation between 
Peronism and its inveterate enemies; by revealing how illusory the hopes labour had 
invested in the notion of factores de poder had been, it had taught the unions that 
they were as dependent on the survival of the electoral system as the political parties. 
Now the military government appeared as an interim regime doomed to be 
replaced as soon as its enemies agreed on the succession; not even the surprising 
endurance of economic stabilisation appeared sufficient to save it. The outcome 
favoured by most included a restoration of political freedoms and social rights under 
a president supported by all the major political forces (and of course labour) and 
acceptable to the armed forces. General Aramburu, the head of the military 
government that had failed in its attempt to uproot the Peronist movement, appeared 
the most likely candidate to occupy the presidency, with the blessing of Augusto 
Vandor, who had taken advantage of the upheavals, created first by the success and 
then by the unexpected breakdown of the Argentine revolution, to reconquer the 
leadership of the labour movement. 
One person was still excluded from this universal reconciliation. Peron was less 
alarmed by the prospect of an Aramburu presidency than by the influence the union 
leadership, that had defied his authority within the Peronist movement, was expected 
to exert over it. He reacted with grim satisfaction to the news of the assassination of 
Vandor by anonymous invaders of his union office, and detected in it the first sign of 
another modification in the collective mood that, by forcing his enemies to accept 
him as a partner in their plans, would open the way to the restoration of power that 
had been his ultimate goal since his fall from grace. 
When one year later General Aramburu was assassinated, this time by an 
underground movement that signed its communiques 'Montoneros', he gave his 
explicit blessing to the venture, and announced that the Peronist movement was on 
the threshold of a radical reorientation inspired by the 'marvellous youth' whose 
heroic revolutionary faith was to bring new life into it. Gradually all the pre-existent 
Peronist underground movements merged into Montoneros, which made its presence 
felt with a succession of local coups de main, kidnappings and assassinations of 
conspicuous members of the labour establishment, who were considered the most 
serious obstacle on the way to the socialist Argentina the youth promised to build 
under the leadership of Peron and the mobilising inspiration of Evita - who was 
being posthumously recast as a committed socialist revolutionary. 
General Agustin Lanusse, who inherited the difficult task of finding an 
honourable way out for the Argentine revolution, was to use the increasing 
underground violence as the main argument in favour of the restoration of 
representative democracy, still resisted by many officers. Only that restoration, he 
argued, could endow the government with legitimate authority in the absence of 
which repression would never totally eliminate the challenge of the underground 
movements. This argument lent Peron - as the only one who could put an end to that 
challenge - a political leverage he was not prepared to renounce by a premature 
demobilisation of what he was now pleased to call his formaciones especiales. The 
exile's new friends in the formerly anti-Peronist parties could not be more 
understanding; they chose to ignore the invocations of Mao's cultural revolution he 
reserved for his youthful followers, and to concentrate on a parallel dialogue in 
which the quotes were borrowed from the founding fathers of Argentina's 
constitutional era. 
The political duel between Lanusse and Peron opposed an intermittently inspired 
amateur to a well-seasoned professional; it ended with an overwhelming victory for 
the professional, who had refused until the end to repudiate the violence of the 
underground. 
However, Peron's welcome to the notionally revolutionary underground, and the 
equally revolutionary youth that sustained it, was not inspired exclusively by short-
term tactical considerations. Thanks to Peron's overwhelming political victory, he 
found himself able to dictate the terms of the institutional reorganisation of the 
Peronist movement and the names of its candidates on the lists of the coalition it led. 
He used the opportunity to raise the youth organisation, totally controlled by 
Montoneros, to the position of fourth branch of the movement, coequal to the 
previous three, and in several large provinces, including that of Buenos Aires, his 
candidates to the governorship sympathised with the emerging party left that had its 
core in the new branch. These decisions are perhaps better understood when one 
looks not at who won, but at who lost due to them. In the lists for Congress, the 
concession of an equal share to the youth was complemented by the recognition of a 
similar share for the smaller partners in the Peronist coalition, which displayed a 
generosity unusual in Peronism's deals with the minuscule allies it carried in its tow; 
the cumulative consequence being that the labour quota fell from 33 per cent to 20 
per cent. And in the gubernatorial choices that of a frondizista in heavily unionised 
Santa Fe, added to those of left-wingers for Buenos Aires, Cordoba and Mendoza, 
denied the labour movement any share in the administration of the larger provinces. 
Obviously, Peron had not forgotten that the only real threat to his leadership had 
come from the leaders of organised labour, and was determined to cut them down to 
size. He needed, moreover, to keep the threat of a rival force within the movement 
alive to force them to support economic policies that would fall short of satisfying 
labour's demands. 
Beyond these specific considerations, Peron's opening of the movement's 
structures to the leftist currents reflected his more permanent concern for the 
dominant influence labour had imposed on the movement since its creation; already 
in 1946 this had moved him to grant an unjustifiably large representation in its 
structures to the dissident Radicals. The problem was that these Radicals had been 
seasoned professional politicians who fully understood the reasons for their 
undeserved success, and the conditions under which they could hope to continue 
reaping its fruits. The underground and the youth were instead convinced that they 
were the wave of the future; Peron was sincerely committed to support them because 
his unerring political instinct had once again brought him to bet on the winner. 
This faith owed very little to their ideological premises; the leaders of the 
Montoneros evolved from integralist Catholicism to a revolutionary activism that 
looked for inspiration in Liberation Theology and the 'revolution in the revolution' 
proclaimed by Regis Debray;2 the eschatological views rooted in the Marxist 
tradition had no hold on them. Their optimism owed more to the reading they made 
of their own experience; if Peron and even Lanusse had flirted with them, it was 
because both rivals had recognised in them the future victors. Peron had assiduously 
nourished these illusions; he was now ready to crush them with increasing brutality. 
Lanusse's only success had consisted in forcing Peron to decline the presidential 
candidacy in the general election of March 1973; the substitute candidate, accused of 
2 See Debray, R., Revolution in the Revolution? (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968). 
harbouring unexpected leftist sympathies, was soon forced to resign and in the 
presidential elections that followed Peron's turn to the right met with the 
overwhelming approval of the voters: the ticket he shared with his third wife won the 
support of two-thirds of the electorate. 
As long as the civil war continued within the Peronist movement, the union 
leadership could be trusted to support the modified stabilisation policies introduced 
by the new administration. However, the significant redistribution favouring wage 
earners that had opened the plan had been followed by an increasingly rapid erosion 
of these early gains, and the unions began to show the first symptoms of grass-roots 
discontent. By June 1974, the problem was serious enough for Peron to call a rally in 
which he threatened to resign if all resistance to the wage restrictions included in the 
stabilisation plan did not cease immediately. It was to be his last speech; the cold he 
had brought to the rally turned into pneumonia and he died on 1 July 1974. If the 
speech left a message for the future, it was that the dilemma that had accompanied 
the Peronist movement from its very origin was as urgent and as resistant to solution 
as it had been the very first day. 
Under the stewardship of Peron's widow,3 the Peronist right wing completed the 
elimination of any residual leftist presence in the movement, making lavish use of 
assassinations, followed by threats that forced many non-militant sympathisers of the 
left (now even of the legalistic currents within the non-Peronist left) into exile. 
Convinced that they had eliminated the threat once posed by the left, the 
improvised or third-rank politicians who surrounded the new president decided to 
tackle the increasing economic instability, reflected in a flourishing black market and 
accelerating inflation. The remedy was to come from a harsher stabilisation plan than 
any of the previous ones; the president expected opposition from the unions, and 
welcomed it as offering her the opportunity to deal with them as decisively as she 
had done with the left. Her advisers were indeed confident that in a violent 
confrontation with the unions, the armed forces would actively support presidential 
authority. They were wrong: the army had just given itself new leaders after rejecting 
the ones Isabel Peron had tried to impose on it, and these leaders made it known that 
they declined to repress the labour movement on her behalf. 
When Isabel Peron was forced into an embarrassingly public surrender to the 
union establishment, the unsolved dilemma that had plagued the Peronist movement 
began to achieve its destructive potential. The botched stabilisation attempt had 
started with a savage devaluation that reactivated the wage-price spiral of inflation. 
The president went through the motions of successive stabilisation plans, 
immediately frustrated by the reaction of union leaders, as aware as she that by 
3 Isabel Peron, who became president after her husband's death. 
imposing increasingly frequent wage rises they were only accelerating the pace 
towards the eventual demise of the government in which they had finally emerged as 
the first factor de poder, but were even so forced to heed the increasing discontent of 
the rank-and-file. Even after the savage purges of real or notional followers of the 
Peronist left among grass-roots militants, that discontent found ways of making itself 
felt; in the rallies in protest at Isabel's first stabilisation, some slogans suggested 
that, for the first time since 1945, Communist organisers were finding an echo in the 
working class. 
In March 1976 the armed forces took power and announced a Process of 
National Reorganisation4 that had more modest declared objectives than the previous 
military takeovers; this time they did not promise to build a new country, but to 
return the old one to normal conditions. All subversive parties and organisations 
were of course outlawed, but this time the traditional parties (the Communist Party 
included) were not dissolved. As is well known, this concern to mimic the conditions 
of a normal life in a normal country was a paradoxical corollary of the decision to 
continue the effort to uproot subversion and the ideological influences that had 
inspired it through a massive clandestine cleaning operation, free from all the 
restraints imposed by law (or for that matter those suggested by common decency). 
It was to be an experience without precedent in Argentine history and with few 
parallels even in the convulsed era of Latin American history in which it took place 
(perhaps only Guatemala exceeded the Argentine levels of brutality and inhumanity 
in the repression). 
It was difficult to imagine that the legacy of the Peronist revolution could have 
survived such a brutal experience. In fact, more of it survived than many had 
expected. After all, Peronism was now recognised as one of the traditional parties, 
and while its leaders were more frequently placed under detention than their main 
rivals, their position was very different from that of the unacknowledged captives of 
the secret prison and extermination system run by the armed forces. The unions' 
experience was also closer to that of earlier repressive phases than to that of the main 
targets of the terrorist state. And the new rulers were to prove less uncompromising 
in their economic policies than in their repressive practices. They made it clear to the 
very conservative team that they placed in charge of the economy that massive 
unemployment was out of the question; and while the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises was among their explicit economic goals, the many officers who 
participated in their administration were as hostile to it as the large number of 
workers who found employment in them. At the inglorious close of the Proceso, the 
state-owned sector was considerably larger than in 1976, in part because it continued 
to offer refuge to enterprises that had been unable to survive in the private sector. 
4 Known universally as the Proceso. 
Moreover, the opening of the economy to international trade was more energetically 
proclaimed than practised; in particular the new industries continued to be sheltered 
by high protective barriers. 
The reasons for these policies varied from the obvious self-interest 
considerations that militated against wholesale privatisation, to the recognition that 
the economic clout of the new industrial sector made it inadvisable to defy it, and to 
the odd notion that unemployment made for a more militant working class. However, 
behind all these there was also an implicit belief in what a good society should be, 
and in it there was no place for unemployment. This belief had been a part of a 
common-sense view of Argentine society that dated from pre-Peronist times but had 
been decisively reinforced by the Peronist experience. 
Admittedly, in other respects the economic policies of the Proceso were much 
less concerned with the welfare of the popular majority. Isabel Peron had left a 
country on the verge of hyperinflation, where real wages had probably already fallen 
lower than the statistics based on frozen prices suggested. A more drastic fall was to 
follow in the early months of the Proceso, and at least a partial recovery would 
certainly have followed, had it not been pre-empted by a freeze on wages, followed 
by readjustments that lagged behind a rate of inflation, that in only year under the 
Proceso fell below 100 per cent. However, while impoverished, society still retained 
the essential features of the profile it had acquired in the Peronist revolution. 
And even that impoverishment had been attenuated by policies that 
systematically overvalued the internal currency and by the partial opening to 
imports, which brought about a drastic fall in prices for a whole array of consumer 
goods, from garments to household appliances and electronics. These imports 
pushed many light industries to a situation close to collapse; they survived thanks to 
generous credits from the state banks, granted on the condition that they retained 
their workers. In turn, these and other economic policies were sustained by a massive 
recourse to foreign credit, which could be obtained at rates of interest close to those 
of external inflation. In 1981, when the rising interest rates in the developed world 
brought these improvident policies to a final crisis, a savage devaluation, 
complemented the next year by restrictions on non-essential imports introduced 
during the war of the South Atlantic - but kept in place for years after the end of the 
emergency - marked a return to a protectionism more extreme than at any moment 
since 1955. 
By then the architects of the Proceso could only show for their efforts a national 
economy in ruins, and the first external war lost by Argentina in its entire history; 
they were in no position to negotiate with the political and social forces the terms for 
yet another transition towards an elected government. Of the two national parties, 
Peronism - which according to common wisdom was the most likely winner in the 
future elections - appeared more ready than its Radical rival to shelter the military 
from the consequences of their own mistakes (and of the crimes against humanity 
that public opinion pretended to have discovered only during the final crisis of the 
military regime); after a long period of political recess the union movement was 
more influential than ever within it. 
Since an open negotiation on the terms for the transition was out of the question, 
the moribund military regime decided to earn the goodwill of organised labour and 
its party (and consolidate the Peronist hold on the popular vote) by introducing a 
generous wage policy. On the eve of the general elections of December 1983, real 
wages had risen to the levels of 1975. Against all expectations, Peronism was to 
suffer its first defeat in wholly competitive elections; the victor was Dr Raul 
Alfonsin, recently elected leader of the Radicals. He owed his success to the efficacy 
with which he presented himself as the alternative to a 'union-military compact' that, 
he denounced, had ruled Argentina under the now universally abominated Proceso 
and was ready to continue ruling the country under the restored democracy. For the 
first time in elections called by an unpopular military regime at the end of its tether, 
Peronism was cast in the role of its political ally and not of its uncompromising 
enemy. 
However, that was not all; by denouncing the pacto sindical-militar, Alfonsin 
implicitly promised to close a long period in Argentine history in which these two 
corporations had been the main political actors. A successful return to democracy 
was incompatible with the notion that elected regimes could only succeed if they 
accepted to become instruments of the factores de poder, their right to rule had been 
bestowed on them by the sovereign people, and it authorised them to impose the law 
on the arrogant factores. However, while Alfonsin promised to break with the 
political traditions and practices developed since the Peronist revolution, the final 
goal of this break was not to eliminate the social changes introduced by that 
revolution, but, on the contrary, to consolidate them by creating the truly democratic 
framework that would provide the political stability needed to ensure the 
permanence of that revolution's social achievements. 
And he was passionate in his identification with these achievements: never again 
- he promised - would the control of real wages be used as an instrument for 
economic stabilisation. This was even more unacceptable because wages were 
already artificially low; rather than containing their rise, he intended to have them 
gradually raised to levels that would return to the working class the modest affluence 
that in its collective memory had marked the golden post-war years. 
The electoral success of Alfonsin rewarded his instinctive accord with the mood 
of the moment; in a country exhausted by too many terrifying political experiences, 
he evoked a remote, and partially imaginary, past of order and stability under the 
constitution, but reassuringly promised that this return would not demand the 
rejection of what was positive in the legacy of more recent and troubled times. 
However, Alfonsfn's success also owed something to the fact that the society that 
clung to the legacy of the Peronist revolution had already been more changed than it 
knew by the gradual erosion of the social model inherited from that revolution. 
Changes were visible everywhere. In the northern and western provinces, the 
satellite agricultural economies that had provided sugar, wine, cotton, fruits and 
yerba mate suffered from brutal alternations of prosperity and deep recession. When 
recovery took place, it frequently rewarded a recourse to technology and 
rationalisation of production that diminished the demand for labour; the migrations 
to the larger cities of the modern core of the country could not absorb the vast 
masses thus deprived of sources of livelihood, and gradually the expanded provincial 
bureaucracies were called to serve as de facto welfare systems. 
Since 1963, the littoral and the pampas had enjoyed a steady expansion of 
agricultural production. But already in the initial moment of that process the social 
profile of the grain belts was deeply transformed by the impact of the rent freeze, 
which had allowed some tenants to buy their land below market prices from 
landowners who had seen their rents melt away under the impact of inflation, and 
conversely incited the more affluent landowners to buy back their land from their 
tenants. Soon the progress of mechanisation added its effects to those of the freeze, 
creating new arrangements in which large landowners and small farmers alike 
contracted itinerant contratistas for a whole productive cycle. A more homogeneous 
rural society was emerging, with a landed class at its core. Socially far more 
uncompromisingly conservative than in the past, it offered its firm support to the 
military regimes and during the democratic interludes offered it no less firmly to the 
Radicals. The changes in the Pampas had one element in common with those in the 
peripheral provinces: they drastically reduced the demand for labour, and a new 
wave of rural-urban migration was the consequence. Not only did the belts of shanty 
towns expand around the larger cities (Buenos Aires developed a second, then a 
third, and later a fourth cinturon), but now many towns in the plains were also 
surrounded by mini-shanty towns. 
In urban society changes were more subtle: the proportion of wage-earners in the 
popular classes remained stable around 70 per cent of the economically active 
population, but the share of industrial workers fell; a more drastic fall in the numbers 
of factory owners and managers reflected the breakdown of the early Peronist pattern 
of industrialisation, concentrated on dwarf enterprises. However, not only had the 
industrial workers ceased to be the largest group within the popular classes; they had 
also ceased to be the group which all the others recognised as the natural leader of 
the popular sectors. These changes were reflected in the electoral results of 1983; 
Alfonsin won in not a few working-class districts that had decisively contributed to 
the Peronist victory of 1946. Both the upper-lower class, overwhelmingly Peronist 
until the eve of the election, and the predominantly anti-Peronist lower-middle class 
joined the most volatile section of the electorate, while Peronism now had its most 
solid electoral fortresses among the poorest of the poor, and in most marginal 
provinces. 
True to his promises, President Alfonsin remained carefully aloof from the two 
factores de poder that in his view had played a secondary role in pushing the country 
into a pathological political course - the Church and the corporate organisations of 
business, industry and the landed interest - and attempted as soon as he took power 
to force the two corporations he held mainly responsible for the country's chronic 
political crisis to adapt to the norms of the representative democracy that Argentina 
had decided to become. Much to his disappointment, both refused to mend their 
ways and headed on a collision course with his administration. He was obliged to 
launch a reluctant offensive against the armed forces, and while its long-term success 
now appears evident, it gave him very few victories and - more seriously - in 1987 
brought him a defeat that he refused to acknowledge, with catastrophic consequences 
for the link of mutual confidence he had, until then, managed to retain with a vast 
popular majority. With labour he was even less successful: the reformed union law 
he sent to Congress respected the corporate traditions of Peronist unionism (a single 
union to represent the workers in each branch of industry), but imposed a larger dose 
of internal democracy than the union bosses were ready to accept and was finally 
rejected in the Senate by a single vote; from that time onwards the CGT made the 
Alfonsin administration its main target. 
It was to find increasing opportunities for attack. For a year Alfonsin remained 
true to his programme of gradual rises in real wages; while the unions declared it a 
sham, it contributed, together with the crushing problems derived from the vast 
external debt inherited from the Proceso and the imbalance in public accounts, to a 
accelerating inflationary spiral. By 1985 Argentina was once again on the threshold 
of hyperinflation, and the administration was forced to change route. An imaginative 
economic team immediately introduced successful anti-inflationary strategies that 
won the admiration of their colleagues both in Argentina and abroad, and a few 
months into the implementation of the plan the Radicals were rewarded by the voters 
with a clear victory in congressional elections. However, it gradually became clear 
that the much celebrated Plan Austral had not uprooted inflation, but merely brought 
it down from the dangerous heights it had reached to a more routine 30 per cent a 
year; keeping it at that level required a return to more conventional anti-inflationary 
tactics, gradually resuscitating the inter-sectoral clashes and alliances typical of a 
society that had learned to live with chronic inflation. 
Once again, the clashes between the administration and the unions became the 
most dramatic events in this continuously unfolding story of conflicts and truces. 
However, the thirteen one-day general strikes the CGT launched against the Alfonsfn 
administration caused less alarm than in the past: obligingly scheduled on Mondays 
or Fridays, they enriched the calendar of offers for the now fashionable short 
vacations with a few additional long weekends. 
For all their sound and fury, the general strikes were closer to peaceful ritual 
combats than to conflicts whose outcome held the potential to influence the 
relationship of forces between the participants in them. This did not mean that they 
were harmless occasions: they offered a painful reminder of how badly the Alfonsfn 
administration had failed in its ambition to create a new and harmonious relationship 
with labour. Alfonsin himself was intensely aware of this, and in 1987 he decided to 
face the new congressional elections having achieved peace - and not just a truce -
with labour, by including in his cabinet a union leader who personified all the faults 
he had denounced in the labour bosses. He lost his gamble: while the Peronist vote 
this time exceeded 40 per cent, the alliance with labour alienated the right-wing that 
since 1983 had supported the Radicals. The result was less surprising than 
Alfonsin's inability to foresee it. This seasoned and astute politician's refusal to 
acknowledge the erosion already suffered by the social profile inherited from the 
Peronist revolution appeared even more puzzling considering that that erosion had 
decisively contributed to his previous electoral triumphs. 
We recognise here, once again, the hold that social profile retained on the 
imagination of those who had lived through the Peronist revolution. In the same way 
as the military responsible for the Proceso - having decided that unemployment was 
incompatible with the restoration of the kind of order they strove to impose on the 
country - had been probably less inspired by clearly erroneous understanding of how 
industrial society actually works than by an implicit notion of what the good society 
should be, perhaps this time Alfonsm had been also guided by his stubborn 
identification with the social model introduced in 1945 rather than by the narrowly 
pragmatic inspiration he hoped to follow. 
The erosion Alfonsin refused to acknowledge was already too advanced not to 
influence the actual course of his administration. Thus, while the chronic conflict 
with organised labour loomed large in his view of the relationship of his 
administration with the popular classes, in fact his most ambitious programme 
directed to these classes was the Plan Alimentario Nacional (PAN) that distributed 
basic foodstuffs among the old and new poor of the expanding shanty town belts. 
And even when Alfonsin found himself able to follow his original inspiration in 
dealing with the corporations representing business, industry and rural interests, he 
was equally taking advantage of the very changes he refused to perceive, which had 
deprived them of much of their original clout to the advantage of a narrow group of 
powerful entrepreneurs simultaneously present in all these fields. These became 
Alfonsfn's principal allies within that fragmented factor de poder, until the failure of 
the Plan Austral convinced them that it was time to look for other political partners. 
And that failure itself offered the final proof that the erosion of the society 
created by the Peronist revolution had already decisively affected the impact its 
conflicts had on the country's political developments. The frequent clashes between 
the administration and organised labour suggested that the demise of the Plan 
Austral repeated the scenario of previous episodes, in which an inflationary wage-
price spiral had held central stage. In fact, this was not the case; instead, this time the 
decisive factor was the increasing imbalance in the budget accounts, that did not 
allow the government to honour the terms of the successive plans negotiated with 
international organisations and foreign lenders to deal with the massive external 
debt. 
In turn, such imbalance was not due to the excessive rise of expenditures for the 
central administration and the state enterprises; on the contrary, labour's main 
grudge against the Alfonsm administration came from its reluctance to adjust the 
salaries and wages of the central state's employees to inflation. Instead, the Treasury 
was haemorrhaging from the transfers to provincial administrations that refused to 
follow the lead of central government and happily expanded their personnel. 
The Alfonsin administration could not do otherwise: it had to struggle on so 
many fronts - against a hostile labour organisation and an unruly military, among 
others - that it needed to win at least the benevolent neutrality of the Peronist 
provincial forces. The consequence was that the president had to accept the role of 
paymaster for the provincial fortresses of the rival party. The cost was paid by the 
Radical provincial administrations, which were expected to make life easier for the 
president by moderating their demands on the Treasury: in the 1987 elections the 
Peronists won control of several key provinces, from Buenos Aires to Mendoza in 
the west and Misiones in the north-east and several others in between. From that 
time onwards the pressure from the provinces became both irresistible and 
unbearable. 
These developments reflected a radical change in the balance of political and 
social forces, that was equally to influence the new profile under which Peronism 
was to ride to victory in the presidential election of 1989. In 1987 it had achieved a 
more narrow victory under the leadership of an internal current (renovation 
peronista) committed to the principles of internal democracy, and outspoken in its 
hostility to the traditional influence of the bosses of organised labour. Encouraged by 
their success, the renovadores raised the presidential candidacy of the veteran 
Antonio Cafiero, in the past a faithful political agent of Lorenzo Miguel, who had 
inherited from Vandor the leadership of the metalworkers' union, still dominant in 
the labour movement, but who had enthusiastically converted to the principles of 
renovation peronista. Cafiero contemptuously rejected Miguel's offers of support; 
he was as aware as everybody else that the union establishment was now 
overwhelmingly unpopular, and this extended even to the workers it notionally 
represented (it was accused, perhaps unfairly, of not putting enough zeal into the 
defence of the interests of the rank-and-file, and less unfairly of concentrating its 
efforts in the defence of the legal privileges of the deteriorating public health and 
leisure empires controlled by the unions, from which it was suspected, not without 
reason, of deriving significant personal profits), and was convinced that any intimacy 
with the despised labour bosses might put in jeopardy a victory that appeared at 
hand. Miguel was forced to move labour's support to a rival candidate, Carlos Saul 
Menem, whom he knew he could not trust, and probably it was that support that 
allowed Menem to achieve a narrow victory in the first direct elections to choose a 
presidential candidate in the entire history of the Peronist movement. 
But Menem had not won as labour's candidate. He was the most astute of the 
provincial bosses who were building unbeatable electoral machines in marginal 
provinces. During Alfonsin's prolonged honeymoon with the country, he played the 
role of the president's man in the Peronist movement with such panache that he won 
a popularity second only to that of the president. With exquisite sense of timing, he 
gradually distanced himself from the Federal administration, but he was careful to 
retain a privileged link with the federal Treasury, to the point that in 1989 more than 
half the active economic population of La Rioja5 was on the provincial payroll. To 
the support of most provincial bosses in the country's periphery he added that of the 
most loyal followers Peronism retained in the modern core of Argentina by working 
the shanty towns with frenzied intensity. His message, if imprecise, was reassuring: 
'Follow me, I won't disappoint you', and he proclaimed it in rallies that mimicked 
those of the charismatic evangelical preachers who were making converts by the 
hundreds of thousands in the same neighbourhoods. 
His candidacy was met with intense alarm by the whole political class, and 
invited the worst forecasts about the economic future of a country that could not 
afford the return to the policies that Menem's appeal to the most folkloric aspects of 
the Peronist tradition suggested as probable. Actually his victory in the presidential 
primaries accelerated the economic breakdown that brought the Alfonsin 
administration to a disastrous close; when the election was held in 1989, the country 
was in the throes of hyperinflation. Even then, Menem inspired as much fear as 
hope, and his victory was surprisingly narrow, considering that his rival raised the 
banner of the party under whose administration the country was suffering at that very 
moment the worst economic adversity in its entire history. 
The catastrophe of hyperinflation was universally read as the final verdict on the 
Peronist revolution. As it appeared now, in its desperate effort to save its legacy, the 
5 La Rioja is President Menem's home state and where he was elected governor. 
country had faced increasingly violent economic storms, until the last one had 
threatened to destroy the basic links that hold a society together. Whether this was 
the case, or rather this final crisis occurred when much in that legacy had already 
been dissipated, unarguably the society that emerged from it not only was not the 
one shaped by the Peronist revolution, but - perhaps more importantly - it was now 
aware of it. 
President Menem was now free to build a new political base for the Peronist 
movement he led. Taking advantage of the horrified collective memory of 
hyperinflation, he refashioned it as an alliance of the top and the bottom of society in 
support of a savage programme of stabilisation and privatisation, supported even by 
the passive consensus of the middle sections of society that declined to join the new 
electoral majority. 
Thus has the Peronist movement managed to survive the society reshaped by the 
Peronist revolution. But this remarkable achievement owes something - perhaps a 
great deal - to the fact that from its very origin that movement found support beyond 
the social sectors that benefited from the Peronist revolution, and that such support 
was to expand in the course of the movement's troubled history, at the same time as 
these benefited sectors gradually lost much of their original political and social clout. 
How durable will President Menem's political achievement be? The elections in 
October 1997 suggest that its future is less assured than it might have appeared until 
recently. But the political reorientation adumbrated in the recent electoral results 
does not suggest any return to past alignments. Rather, what emerges from it is a new 
electoral cleavage that evokes - to use an anachronistic but totally pertinent 
vocabulary - the old opposition between the classes and the masses. This is not the 
only development that suggests that, for the countries in what we used to call the 
periphery, the post-industrial age appears to have much in common with pre-
industrial times. 
